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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ida Perez Vasquez appeals from her judgment of conviction for intimidating a
witness. Because the district court conducted a court trial without obtaining an express,
personal waiver of her right to a jury trial, Ms. Vasquez asserts that her conviction must
be vacated.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April of 2009, Maurilia Ortega reported that her daughter, D.P., had been
touched inappropriately by her uncle. (Trial Tr., p.20, Ls.16-17.) During a subsequent
forensic interview, D.P. confirmed the allegation. (Trial Tr., p.23, Ls.2-5.) The case was
initially not prosecuted, however, because D.P.’s father informed the police that his
daughter had been coerced into making the statements and that there was a tape of his
daughter recanting her statements. (Trial Tr., p.23, Ls.16-23.) D.P. then recanted to
the police. (Trial Tr., p.26, Ls.16-19.)
However, in 2012, D.P. came forward with new disclosures. (Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.45.) A prosecution ensued, and the uncle eventually pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor.
(Trial Tr., p.29, L.17 – p.30, L.6.)
At trial in this case, D.P. testified that the recantations made on tape were made
to Ms. Vasquez, her aunt, and that her statements on the tape were not true. (Trial
Tr., p.66, Ls.2-12.) She testified that Ms. Vasquez told her what to say. (Trial Tr., p.64,
Ls.17-19.)

Ms. Vasquez testified that her brother, D.P.’s father, gave her the tape

recorder and asked her to have a conversation with D.P. in order to “see what was
going on, to see why she was upset, to see if there was anything else that had to be
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done.” (Trial Tr., p.121, Ls.5-7.) She denied telling D.P. what to say. (Trial Tr., p.124,
Ls.16-17.)
Ms. Vasquez was charged with intimidating a witness, in violation of I.C. § 182604.

(R., p.37.)

After rejecting mediation and demanding a jury trial on several

occasions (R., pp.45; 60), the following occurred on the first day of trial:
THE COURT: Yesterday I was advised by counsel for parties, both the
state and the defendant, that they had stipulated to waive a jury and try
this case to the court. Is this right, Mr. Peterson [the prosecutor]?
MR. PETERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Souza [counsel for Ms. Vasquez]?
MR. SOUZA: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. So the record will reflect that agreement.
(Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.11-20.)

The court never inquired of Ms. Vasquez whether she

agreed with this stipulation.1
Ms. Vasquez was found guilty following the court trial and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and the court suspended
the sentence and placed Ms. Vasquez on probation for a period of four years.
(R., p.130.) Ms. Vasquez appealed. (R., p136.) On appeal, she asserts that the district
court erred by conducting a court trial without obtaining her personal waiver of a jury
trial.

The court did, however, obtain Ms. Vasquez’s personal waiver of a potential conflict of
interest with Mr. Souza. (Trial Tr., p.7, Ls.4-18.)

1

2

ISSUE
Was Ms. Vasquez deprived of her constitutional right to a jury trial, under both the Idaho
and United States Constitutions, when the district court held a court trial in the absence
of a personal, express waiver of that right by Ms. Vasquez?
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ARGUMENT
Ms. Vasquez Was Deprived Of Her Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Under Both The
Idaho And United States Constitutions, When The District Court Held A Court Trial In
The Absence Of A Personal, Express Waiver Of That Right By Ms. Vasquez
A.

Introduction
Without first obtaining an express, personal waiver of Ms. Vasquez’s

constitutional right to a jury trial, under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions,
the district court found her guilty following a court trial. The district court never inquired
of Ms. Vasquez whether she wished to waive her right to a jury trial.
Ms. Vasquez asserts that her constitutional right to a jury trial was violated when
her guilt was found by the district court, rather than a jury, in the absence of a personal
waiver. While Ms. Vasquez did not object to the lack of a jury trial below, she asserts
that the deprivation represents fundamental, structural error, and therefore, can be
considered for the first time on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, this Court
should vacate the judgment of conviction.
B.

Standards Of Review
1.

Fundamental Error

In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court announced its
adoption of a fundamental error analysis applicable to most unpreserved claims of
constitutional violations. For most such claims, this Court will only provide relief if the
defendant satisfies a three-prong test by establishing that the error: “(1) violates one or
more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
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information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28.
Some unpreserved constitutional errors – “structural defects” – are of such
magnitude that they defy the application of the harmless error test set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

The

constitutional rights underlying such structural defects “are so basic to a fair trial that the
violation of those rights requires an automatic reversal and is not subject to harmless
error analysis.”

Id. at 222 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)).

Structural defects are those “which affect ‘the framework within which the trial proceeds,
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself’ and thus are so inherently unfair
that they are not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S.
at 307-08.)
In Perry, this Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had only found
the following errors to be structural: “(1) complete denial of counsel; (2) biased trial
judge; (3) racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury; (4) denial of selfrepresentation at trial; (5) denial of a public trial; (6) defective reasonable doubt
instruction; and (7) erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice.” Id. (internal
citations omitted). The Perry Court noted, “[a]lthough there may be other constitutional
violations that would so affect the core of the trial process that they would require an
automatic reversal, as a general rule, most constitutional violations will be subject to
harmless error analysis.” Id. at 222-23 (citation omitted). In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275 (1993), the United States Supreme Court, discussing the right to a jury trial
guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment, concluded, “[t]he deprivation of that right, with
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consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably
qualifies as ‘structural error.’” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281-82.
2.

Waiver Of A Constitutional Right

“[T]he state has a heavy burden in overcoming a presumption against the waiver
of constitutional rights.”

State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 276 (1985) (citation

omitted). On appeal, a waiver of a constitutional right “will be upheld if the entire record
demonstrates the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” State v.
Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 95 (2004); see also State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 498 (1983)
(appellate court looks to the totality of the circumstances when assessing whether trial
court properly found a valid waiver of a constitutional right).
C.

Ms. Vasquez Was Deprived Of Her Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Under
Both The Idaho And United States Constitutions, When The District Court Held A
Court Trial In The Absence Of Any Waiver By Ms. Vasquez
Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, in relevant part, provides, “[t]he right

of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal
cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court, and in civil actions by the
consent of the parties, signified in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” IDAHO
CONST. Art. I § 7. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant
part, provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Idaho
Constitution provides greater protection of the right to a jury trial in a criminal case than
the Sixth Amendment. See State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 100-01 (Ct. App. 1988)
(Sixth Amendment guarantees jury trial only for “serious, non-petty offense[s],” while
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Article I, Section 7 guarantees jury trial for “all public offenses which are potentially
punishable by imprisonment or where potential fines or other sanctions are punitive in
nature”) (citations omitted).
In concluding that a criminal defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial, the United States Supreme Court has explained that because the right is so
important it must be “jealously preserved,” and, “that, before any waiver can become
effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had,
in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant.” Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (emphasis added). The Court concluded by noting, “the duty of the
trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound
and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from”
the preference for trial by jury, with the court’s “caution increasing in degree as the
offenses dealt with increase in gravity.” Id. at 312-13.
The plain language of the Idaho Constitution provides that a criminal defendant
may waive his right to a jury trial when such a waiver is “expressed in open court.” The
Idaho Supreme Court has explained, “[a] waiver of a jury trial will not be implied in
doubtful cases.” Neal v. Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Ada County, 42 Idaho 624, __, 248 P.
22, 24 (1926) (citations omitted). The Idaho Court of Appeals adopted the American
Bar Association’s recommendation that a “‘[c]ourt shall not accept a waiver unless the
defendant, after being advised by the court of his right to a trial by jury, personally
waives his right to trial by jury, either in writing or in open court for the record,’”
concluding, “[a] requirement that the Court personally address the defendant will not

7

constitute an undue burden on the courts where this very important right is at issue.”
State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 966 (Ct. App. 1985) (citation omitted).
Ms. Vasquez did not expressly waive her right to a jury trial under Article I,
section 7, of the Idaho Constitution, either in writing or in open court. The error is of
constitutional magnitude, is plain on the face of the record, is structural, and is,
therefore, not subject to harmless error analysis. As such, Ms. Vasquez is entitled to
have her conviction vacated.
This Court recently addressed a claim by a defendant the personal waiver of a
jury trial is required in State v. Umphenour, 160 Idaho 503, 376 P.3d 707 (2016). In
Umphenour, on the morning of a scheduled jury trial, the parties indicated that they had
reached an agreement whereby the defendant would stipulate to certain facts the
district court would make findings based on those facts. Id., 160 Idaho at __, 376 P.3d
at 708. Mr. Umphenour’s counsel then read the elements of offense and the prosecutor
stipulated to those facts. Id. The district court then asked Mr. Umphenour if he was
stipulating to those fact and he responded, “[y]eah.” Id. The district court then found
him guilty based on the stipulated facts. Id. at __, 709.
On appeal, Mr. Umphenour asserted that the district court erred by conducting a
court trial without obtaining a personal, express waiver of a jury trial from
Mr. Umphenour.

Id.

This Court did not resolve the issue, however, because it

concluded that the unusual proceeding was actually a guilty plea and not a court trial.
Id. at __, 709-10.
Justice Burdick disagreed. He concluded that an “irregular” court trial occurred
and that the parties and the court understood that a court trial occurred. Id. at __, 712-
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13.

Applying Idaho’s fundamental error standard, he would have vacated

Mr. Umphenour’s conviction. Id. at __, 714. His argument was based on the Idaho
Constitution:
Article I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution [. . . ] directs how that right to a jury
trial may be waived. It states:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.... A trial by jury may be
waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in
open court, and in civil actions by the consent of the parties, signified in
such manner as may be prescribed by law.
Idaho Const. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added). There is nothing in the Idaho
Constitution that requires a defendant to personally waive his right to a
jury. However, a few years after the Idaho Constitution was amended to
allow a defendant to waive his right to a jury trial in all criminal cases, the
Idaho Supreme Court adopted a criminal rule that sets the standard for
waiver of a jury trial in felony cases. Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) states:
In felony cases issues of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a trial by jury
is waived by a written waiver executed by the defendant in open court with
the consent of the prosecutor expressed in open court and entered in the
minutes.
(emphasis added). Thus, although the Idaho Constitution does not
explicitly require a defendant to personally waive the right to a jury trial,
this Court has promulgated a Rule requiring such a personal waiver in
felony cases. The Constitution contemplates that the manner in which the
right to a jury trial is waived may be prescribed by law, which is precisely
what Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) does. Thus, in felony cases, I would hold
that a defendant must personally waive the right to a jury trial for that
waiver to be constitutionally valid.
Id. Justice Burdick concluded, “[b]ecause the record does not show that Umphenour
personally waived his right to a jury trial, there was a clear violation of his constitutional
right to a trial by jury. Consequently, the first two prongs of the fundamental error
analysis have been met.” Id. at __, 715.
Finally, Justice Burdick concluded that the invalid waiver of the right to a jury trial
is a structural error which automatically satisfies the third prong of the fundamental error
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analysis. Id. He stated, “an invalid waiver falls under the same umbrella as a ‘denial of
a public trial’ structural defect because by accepting an invalid waiver, the trial court is,
in essence, denying the defendant a jury trial. Id. at __, 716. He also noted that several
circuit courts had agreed. Id. (citing United States v. Duarte–Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000,
1003 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e conclude that this error warrants reversal because the district
court's failure to ensure the adequacy of [the defendant’s] jury waiver affected the basic
framework of [the defendant’s] trial and we cannot determine whether this effect was
harmless.”); Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir.2002) (finding that the
defendant's attorney’s waiver of a jury trial was structural error requiring automatic
reversal of the defendant’s conviction).

Id. at _ , 716–17.

Here, as in Miller,

Ms. Vasquez’s attorney waived the jury trial, not Ms. Vasquez herself.
Finally, Justice Burdick concluded that this structural error was not subject to
harmless error analysis because the effect of an invalid waiver would be difficult to
determine and the consequences are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminable.
Id. at __, 718.
Ms. Vasquez urges this Court to adopt Justice Burdick’s rationale from his
dissent in Umphenour. Unlike Umphenour, there can be no dispute that what occurred
here was a court trial. The court heard evidence from both parties and ultimately found
Ms. Vasquez guilty on contested facts, mainly her intent in questioning and recording
D.P.

Because an invalid waiver of the right to a jury trial constitutes fundamental,

structural error under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions, Ms. Vasquez
requests that her conviction be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Vasquez requests that her conviction be vacated and her case remanded for
further proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2016.

___________/s/______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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